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ntangible assets are both large and important. However,
 current financial statements provide very little information 
about these assets. Even worse, much of the information that is 
provided is partial, inconsistent, and confusing, leading to 
significant costs to companies, to investors, and to society as a 
whole. Solving this problem will require on-balance-sheet 
accounting for many of these assets as well as additional 
financial disclosures. These gains can be achieved, but only if 
users of financial information insist upon improvements to 
corporate reporting.
2. The Magnitude of Intangible Assets
In a recent paper, Leonard Nakamura of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia uses three different approaches to 
estimate the corporate sector’s amount of investment in 
intangible assets.1 The first approach is based on accounting for 
the investments in research and development (R&D), software, 
brand development, and other intangibles. The second uses the 
wages and salaries paid to “creative workers,” those workers 
who generate intangible assets. The third approach, which is 
quite innovative, examines the changes in operating margins of 
firms—the difference between sales and the cost of sales. 
Dr. Nakamura argues, persuasively, that the major reason for 
improvement in reported gross margin is the capture of value 
from intangible assets, such as cost savings from Internet-based 
supply chains.
Although all three approaches yield slightly different 
estimates of the value of investments in intangible assets, the 
estimates converge around $1 trillion in 2000—a huge level of 
investment, almost as much as the corporate sector’s invest-
ment in fixed assets and machinery that year. Dr. Nakamura 
estimates the capitalized value of these investments using a 
quite conservative depreciation rate. His conclusion is that the 
net capitalized value is about $6 trillion, a significant portion of 
the total value of all stocks in the United States.
One way to determine if this estimate of the value of 
intangible assets is reasonable is to compare the market values 
of companies with the book values (the net assets) that appear 
on their balance sheets to see if there is a large unmeasured 
factor. Data for the S&P 500 companies, which account for 
about 75 percent of the total assets of the U.S. economy, reveal 
that since the mid-1980s, there has been a large increase in the 
ratio of market value to book value, albeit with very high 
volatility. At its peak in March 2000, the ratio of market value 
to book value was 7.5. At the end of August 2002, it was 4.2, and 
it may still go down. However, even if the ratio fell to 4 or even 3, 
it would be sufficiently higher than it was in prior periods, and 
high enough to confirm that an amount of value equal to 
between one-half and two-thirds of corporate market values 
reflects the value of intangible assets.
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Recently, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has 
been discussing what he calls “conceptual assets.” In testimony 
to the House of Representatives in February 2002, he noted that 
the proportion of our GDP that results from the use of 
conceptual, as distinct from physical, assets has been growing, 
and that the increase in value-added due to the growth of these 
assets may have lessened cyclical volatility. However, he then 
argued that physical assets retain a good portion of their value 
even if the reputation of management is destroyed, while 
intangible assets may lose value rapidly. The loss in value of 
intangible assets by Enron was noted by Chairman Greenspan. 
Two weeks later, a major article in the Wall Street Journal asked 
where all the intangible assets have gone, mentioning Enron 
and Global Crossing specifically.
To investigate this issue, I asked one of my Ph.D. students to 
review the financial reports of these firms. The result was 
astounding: these companies did not spend a penny on 
research and development. There is no mention of R&D in 
Enron’s last three annual reports. Expenditures to acquire 
technology, for brand enhancement and for trademarks, were 
tiny. Spending on new software was significant, but it was very 
small compared with spending on physical assets. To say that 
Enron had huge intangible assets that somehow disappeared 
blurs the difference between market value and book value due 
to “hype,” with the difference due to the creation of a true 
intangible asset.
3. The Myth of “Conservative 
Accounting”
Five or six years ago, when I began discussing the problems 
caused by the accounting system’s mismeasurement of 
investment in intangible assets, the common wisdom was that 
the immediate expensing of intangibles was good because it 
was “conservative.” (Conservative in the accounting sense 
means that you underestimate earnings and the value of assets.) 
However, the lives of the assets, their creation costs, and the 
cash flows generated have a time dimension, which is fixed. 
Therefore, if you are “conservative” in some periods, you will 
end up being “aggressive” (inflating earnings) in others.
The exhibit that I have included shows the results of a model 
that two colleagues and I developed that relates the rate of 
growth in R&D spending to three popular measures of 
company performance: return on equity, return on assets, and 
growth in earnings (what analysts call “momentum”).2 The 
solid line in the exhibit shows corporate performance if the 
R&D spending is capitalized; the dashed line shows the 
performance resulting from the immediate expensing of R&D 
or other intangibles.
As the model shows, companies with high growth rates of 
R&D spending report conservatively when they expense 
intangibles. However, companies with low growth rates 
actually report aggressively. For these companies, the reported 
levels of return on equity, the return on assets, and the growth 
in earnings appear to be much better than they really are. The 
inflection point occurs when the rate of spending growth is 
equal to the company’s cost of capital.
It is therefore a myth that the mismeasurement of 
profitability and assets due to the expensing of investment in 
intangibles results in conservative accounting. Expensing 
intangibles is conservative for some companies, aggressive 
for others, and erroneous for all. For example, in the 
pharmaceutical industry, many major firms have low (single-
digit) rates of R&D growth. (Their R&D expenditures are high 
in absolute terms, but the rate of growth is low.) Because 
expenditures are not growing rapidly, adding R&D expenses to 
earnings and subtracting amortization expenses due to past 
R&D expenditures does not increase earnings by much. 
However, the capitalization of past R&D causes a large addition 
to total assets and hence to equity, the denominator of the 
return-on-equity ratio. Thus, reported return on equity is 
biased upward substantially, as much as 20 percentage points 
or more, for these companies.
The harm associated with failing to capitalize intangible 
assets is greater if managers manipulate R&D expenditures to 
meet profit goals. (Recall that it is the change in investment, 
rather than the level of investment, that causes much of the 
misstatement.) Several studies have concluded that this type of 
manipulation does occur. One study found that companies 
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R&D expenditures, presumably because those CEOs did not 
care about the long-term consequences of the R&D cuts. 
Another study found that large decreases in R&D occurred 
when companies were close to issuing additional equity.
4. Related Accounting Problems
As an exception to the general rule regarding intangible assets, 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement 86 
mandates the capitalization of software development costs 
incurred from the point of “technological feasibility.” 
However, many software companies are not following the rule. 
Companies that are very profitable, like Microsoft or Oracle, 
do not capitalize software expenditures, deferring profits to the 
future. Less profitable companies tend to capitalize significant 
amounts of software development. Thus, you have an 
accounting rule that is followed by some and not by others, 
making it very difficult for outsiders to rely on reported 
financial information.
In addition, the accounting methods for purchased 
intangible assets are inconsistent with the accounting methods 
for internally generated intangible assets. Expenditures to build 
a brand name are immediately expensed. Expenditures to 
purchase a brand name, either directly or while acquiring a 
company, are capitalized. Further confusing the issue, 
expenditures to acquire in-process R&D are expensed, even in 
arm’s-length transactions. The accounting rules for intangibles 
do not make much economic sense or common sense, and 
companies have been inconsistent in their application of the 
rules, creating significant mismeasurement and misreporting 
issues. To gauge the size of this problem, note that during the 
1990s, thousands of acquisitions were made primarily to obtain 
technology. Cisco alone made close to seventy acquisitions in 
the late 1990s, in one case paying almost $7 billion for a 
company that in its entire public existence had sales of 
$15 million. Clearly, the acquisitions were not made for the 
chairs or buildings, but for the company’s intangible assets.
In 1998, I examined a sample of 380 companies and found 
that an average of 85 percent of the total acquisition price was 
expensed as in-process R&D. Two Wall Street Journal articles 
were written on this topic, and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) started to take the issue seriously. Within a 
year, the rate of expensing decreased to 45 percent. Thus, 
management, at least then, had considerable flexibility and 
opportunities for manipulation.
For some types of investment in intangibles, financial 
reports leave us completely in the dark, even with respect to 
expenditures. For example, most companies do not report how 
much they spend on employee training, on brand 
enhancement, or on software technology. Few companies 
indicate how much they spend on the types of R&D 
undertaken, such as basic versus applied research.
5. Consequences
A consequence of the mismeasurement and deficient reporting 
of intangible assets is a significant deterioration in the 
information content of key financial statement items. To judge 
the information loss, Paul Zarowin and I estimated the 
information content of earnings announcements based upon 
the correlation between the announcements and the change in 
stock prices around the time of the announcements.3 We found 
that there has been a constant decrease in the magnitude and 
stability of the role that earnings, the change in book values 
(net assets on the balance sheet), and operating cash flow 
announcements play in investors’ decisions. If equity prices 
reflect all the information that investors receive from all 
sources, the contribution made by earnings and other financial 
measures has been decreasing throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
Furthermore, our paper shows that firms with significant 
changes in R&D spending are the ones for which the 
information deterioration is the worst.
Another clear indication of a deterioration in the 
information content of financial reports is that managers are 
feverishly looking for alternative measures of corporate 
performance for internal purposes. The need for alternatives 
explains the recent popularity of “balanced scorecard” systems, 
in which nonfinancial measures are added to financial 
measures in order to set goals and gauge performance.
A second consequence of the mismeasurement of 
intangible assets is a systematic undervaluation of companies 
that are intensive in intangibles. In one recent study, 
portfolios of companies were created based on R&D 
intensity.4 The authors reasoned that if investors fully 
recognized and fully valued contemporaneous information, 
in efficient markets, the subsequent risk-adjusted (abnormal) 
returns of the portfolios should average to zero. What the 
authors (and others) found is that firms with high R&D 
expenditures relative to market values—particularly young 
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systematically undervalued relative to other firms. The risk-
adjusted returns to portfolios of these companies were, two 
to four years later, systematically positive and very large—as 
m u c h  a s  6p e r c e n t  t o  7p e r c e n t  p e r  y e a r .
Systematic undervaluation means that the cost of capital of 
these companies is excessive; it is more difficult for these firms 
to finance R&D and other investments that create intangible 
assets. Several macroeconomic studies have shown that R&D 
investment in the United States is about half the optimal level, 
from a social point of view. To the extent that this under-
investment is a result of a lack of information, this lack of 
information has serious social consequences.
Another consequence of the misreporting, or absence of 
reporting, of intangible assets is that gains are misallocated to 
insiders. David Aboody and I recently examined all insider 
transactions by corporate officers reported to the SEC from 
1985 to 1999, measuring the gains to insiders between the time 
of the transaction and the time that the transaction was 
reported to the SEC.5 (I should note that, in my view, it is 
difficult to understand why the SEC does not eliminate the lag 
between insider transactions and their reporting. Disclosure 
now takes, on average, close to a month. With today’s 
electronic reporting systems, an electronic copy could go to 
the SEC, not the next day, but as soon as the transaction is 
completed.) Our study found that in R&D-intensive firms, the 
gains were four times larger than the gains to insiders in other 
firms. The reason, of course, is that there is huge information 
asymmetry in companies with high levels of R&D spending. 
Even more serious than the reallocation of gains from outside 
investors to insiders is a deterioration in the integrity of capital 
markets, which is a clear and serious social cost of this 
information asymmetry. To gauge the extent of the problem, 
recall that many people considered Enron a company with 
numerous intangible assets.
In another study, two colleagues and I recently ranked 
3,000 companies by the amount of distortion in book value 
that resulted from the expensing of R&D. The portfolio of 
companies with the highest amount of distortion had a 
subsequent rate of return that was 15 percentage points higher 
than that of the portfolio of companies with average distortion 
and 30 percentage points higher than that of the portfolio of 
companies with the least distortion.
Even worse, in many cases, managers either do not have 
much better information themselves, or they are “managing by 
the numbers” in response to the feedback they receive from 
capital markets and financial analysts. Because financial 
analysts are often unaware of the importance of these issues, 
companies are underinvesting in intangible assets—an action 
that has a considerable social cost.
6. Remedies
To understand what can be done to improve the situation, it is 
important to discuss both “recognition” and “disclosure” 
issues. Recognition means that the item affects the balance 
sheet or the income statement; disclosure is the provision of 
information, usually in footnotes, without affecting the balance 
sheet or the income statement. To resolve the current problem, 
both more recognition and more disclosure are required.
The battle in the mid-1990s over accounting for stock 
options clearly shows the difference between recognition and 
disclosure. Managers vehemently objected to recognizing 
employee-manager stock options as an expense in the income 
statement. They won the battle, and the standard called only for 
footnote disclosure. Although extensive stock option 
information was disclosed in a large footnote in every financial 
report—Bears Stearns even provided its customers with a list of 
companies’ earnings, adjusted to reflect the costs of stock 
options—a widespread underappreciation of the importance 
and costs of stock options still resulted.
To provide as much information with as much clarity as 
possible, I propose a new comprehensive balance sheet that 
recognizes the creation of those intangible assets to which you 
can attribute streams of benefits. A comprehensive balance 
sheet—like the comprehensive income statement, which is 
now required under Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles—adds information to a financial statement (or, if 
investors wish to retain the previous balance sheet, it adds a 
new statement). With a comprehensive balance sheet, investors 
will have clear information about the company, both with and 
without the capitalization of intangible assets. The proposed 
capitalized intangibles will include R&D, patents, brands, and 
sometimes organizational capital.
However, this is not to say that disclosure is unimportant. 
Two colleagues and I have created a disclosure index for 
biotech companies, based on information in the companies’ 
prospectuses regarding patents, the results of clinical tests, 
prospective market shares for their products, and other factors. 
We found that the index provided considerable additional 
information about future market performance. In another 
study, a Ph.D. student of mine examined the disclosures made 
by a sample of companies that acquired trademarks from other 
companies. The companies that disclosed their plans for using 
an acquired trademark and the likely prospects benefited from 
a significant market reaction, even after accounting for other 
variables. Similarly, disclosure of information about the 
success of R&D—such as citations to the company’s patents, 
licensing royalties, and the success of clinical tests—would 
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and time periods, based upon the presence or absence of these 
signals.
To facilitate disclosure, we should create, via accounting 
regulation, a common language, so that meaningful compari-
sons of intangible assets can be made. Many companies are 
already providing information about consumer satisfaction. 
However, by the company’s calculation, satisfaction is 
always near 100 percent. Without a common standard for 
calculation—a common language—the information is largely 
useless.
To see how a common language could be created, consider 
customer acquisition costs. A common definition—perhaps 
new customers who remain customers for at least two or three 
years—would allow us to measure the asset in a way that could 
be compared meaningfully across companies. Creating a 
common language is not intrusive and can decrease 
information asymmetry significantly.
In France, companies are required to disclose “innovation 
revenues,” those revenues that come from recently introduced 
products. Such revenues indicate the ability of a company to 
innovate and to bring the innovations to market quickly. 
Several studies by French economists have shown that this 
information is very valuable in predicting the future growth 
and productivity of companies. However, outside France, 
investors rarely receive any information on innovation 
revenues. In some cases, even managers themselves do not have 
this information.
In a recent book, I propose a Value Chain Blueprint, which 
brings all of these concepts together into a system that enables 
one to present more clearly the value-creation activities of a 
company.6 The Value Chain Blueprint, which applies to the 
creation of tangible as well as intangible assets, shows how to 
measure the success of value-creation projects from the early 
stages of development through commercialization.
7.G o i n g  F o r w a r d
I would like to sum up by posing a key question: How can we 
accomplish the main objective I have described today—
namely, promoting improvements to the reporting of 
intangible assets? 
Much depends on you. I work intimately with the FASB—
which, by the way, is currently working on an intangibles 
disclosure project—and the accounting industry’s other 
standard-setters. As they add items to the agenda and develop 
accounting rules and standards, these standard-setters solicit 
feedback. Managers, CEOs, and accountants from accounting 
firms usually comment extensively, because they are the 
individuals most directly affected by any changes. However, to 
the best of my knowledge, the FASB rarely hears from 
policymakers and those in charge of national income 
accounting—individuals who are interested in obtaining good, 
objective information. If users of financial information are to 
receive the information that they need, they must become more 
involved in accounting standard-setting. 
The forces of the status quo are immense and are fighting 
against meaningful change, even today. The involvement of 
you and your colleagues can therefore make an important 
difference in the outcome.Endnotes
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1. See Nakamura (2001).
2. See Lev, Sarath, and Sougiannis (1999).
3. See Lev and Zarowin (1999).
4. See Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001).
5. See Aboody and Lev (2000).
6. See Lev (2001).
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